Abstract
Introduction
How do buyers and sellers divide the surplus? The finance paradigm assumes that investors can always trade with the market maker who is willing to take unlimited positions in the security. 1 The market maker can be an officially designated specialist who posts bid and ask quotes, a securities dealer who supplies liquidity through the limit order book, or any active, professional trader. As a result of Bertrand competition among such traders, the surplus flows to the investors, while the market maker only gets compensation for his transaction costs. Although this view is standard in finance, there might be circumstances when there is no market maker who is willing to take the other side of the trade and investors must expend time to search for a counter party with whom there are gains from trade. When there is search, buyers and sellers may share the rents. In this paper, we provide evidence from tax arbitrage which is consistent with a search equilibrium.
We study the price formation around two events which generate tax obligations that differ across investors in the Norwegian stock market. The first event is the distribution of a tax credit to the shareholders at the turn of the year. The tax credit shields investment income tax in Norway, but has no value to tax-exempt Norwegian investors or to foreign investors who do not pay Norwegian taxes. However, the tax-exempt and foreign investors can benefit from the tax credit by temporarily transferring the ownership of the stock over the distribution: The stock is sold to a taxable Norwegian investor before the turn of the year and then purchased back at a lower price in the beginning of the new year. The difference between the sell price and the repurchase price is a capital gain to the seller and a capital loss to the buyer. The size of the buyer's loss can be estimated from the change in the stock price over the distribution.
By relating the estimated loss to the value of the tax credit, we can impute how the buyer and the seller divide the surplus.
The second event is the payment of the annual dividend. Dividends are tax-exempt in Norway, but subject to a withholding tax for foreign investors. The foreign investor can avoid the withholding tax through a temporary stock transfer which works much like the transfer of the tax credit: The foreign investor sells his stock to a domestic investor before the payment of the dividend and purchases it back at a lower price ex-dividend. As with the tax credit, we 1 See, e.g., the surveys by Madhavan (2000) and Biais, Glosten, and Spatt (2002) .
can impute the division of the surplus from the relationship between the price drop over the ex-dividend day and the dividend amount.
The simple structure of the Norwegian tax code allows us to accurately estimate how the buyers and the sellers divide the surplus. The tax credit shields investment income tax at the flat 28% rate for taxable Norwegian investors, but has no value to tax-exempt and foreign investors (0% rate). Since there are only two tax rates, we know exactly the value of the tax credit and only need to estimate the unobservable transaction costs. Similarly, dividends are generally tax-exempt in Norway (0% rate), while foreign investors from all the major investor countries are subject to a withholding tax of 15%. Foreign mutual funds and pension funds are often taxexempt in their home country and face no other taxes than the Norwegian withholding tax. The dividend case is not quite as clean as the tax credit case, since many tax treatments are possible, but we know that only foreign investors have a tax incentive to avoid the dividend. We find in our data that the parties split the tax credit in the middle with slightly more than 50% to the seller and, accordingly, slightly less than 50% to the buyer. This finding contrasts sharply with how the parties split the dividend tax liability, where 100% flows to the seller (foreign investor) and 0% to the buyer (domestic investor) net of transaction costs. This striking, empirical difference is the focus of our paper.
We interpret the interior split of the tax credit as a search equilibrium as in Diamond (1971) , Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) , and Binmore and Herrero (1988) . 2 The theory assumes that potential buyers and sellers are matched randomly. Once the trading parties are locked into a bilateral monopoly, they bargain under the threat of returning to the market for a new match.
After completing the trade, they leave the market and do not seek another match. The theory predicts that the short side of the market has an advantage and gets at least half of the surplus, but this advantage is mitigated by frictions to either the matching or the bargaining process. In our application, the number of potential buyers of the tax credit is the number of tax payers in Norway, while the number of potential sellers is much less and amounts to the number of taxexempt and foreign investors holding the particular stock which carries the tax credit. Hence, the finding that the few sellers get more than 50% is consistent with the theory prediction that the short side gets a larger share of the surplus but, since the sellers are willing to give up almost 50% of the surplus to the buyers, theory also suggests that sellers are extremely unwilling to 2 See also the text book surveys by Rubinstein (1989) and Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) .
exercise their outside option to return to the market for a new match. Such behavior could result from the fact that sellers are under time squeeze and must trade before the turn of the year when the trading opportunity vanishes. As a result of the time squeeze, the probability to find a new match may be small (matching frictions) or sellers may be impatient to trade (bargaining frictions).
The interior split of the tax credit stands in sharp contrast with the estimated extreme split of the withholding tax that gives 100% of the surplus to the seller and 0% to the buyer.
In fact, our estimates obtained for the simple Norwegian tax structure are remarkably similar to those reported by Boyd and Jagannathan (1994) for the more complicated U.S. tax code. 3 We follow their analysis and interpret the extreme split as the outcome of a costly arbitrage process. Specifically, we think that a foreign shareholder "parks" the dividend-paying stock with a Norwegian bank or brokerage house acting as market maker. The bank quotes simultaneously a purchase price cum-dividend and a lower resell price ex-dividend, thereby offering to take a certain capital loss in exchange for a certain dividend. As long as the dividend exceeds the capital loss by more than the bank's transaction costs, there is demand. Since any bank can provide this service, there is Bertrand competition and the entire surplus flows to the sellers.
The critical difference between the proposed centralized price formation process around the ex-dividend day, where banks and brokerage houses wait for investors to arrive, and the proposed decentralized price formation process around the distribution of the tax credit, where investors search and trade with each other, is the quantity demanded by the banks and brokerage houses.
While demand for dividend capture is potentially infinite, each bank's demand for tax credits seems to be limited to at most a small number. 4 Notably, the banks appear to be unwilling to purchase additional tax credits despite positive expected profits in equilibrium, i.e., (long) arbitrage is prevented. We think this is because the buyer of the tax credit exchanges a certain capital loss for an uncertain income stream sixteen months later. At the time of the trade, the size of the tax credit is unknown and must be estimated. The buyer can mitigate the estimation risk by diversifying across stocks, but diversification means that the demand for the tax credit from each stock is finite. In addition, there are potential legal risks. The only way to benefit is 3 The U.S. tax code provides different tax incentives for retail investors (prefer capital gains), professional traders (tax neutral), and corporations (prefer dividends) in addition to the many possible tax treatments of foreign investors who are active in the U.S. stock market. 4 Middlemen may help buyers and sellers to find each other without taking an active ownership stake on their own. See Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) .
to claim the tax credit in the personal tax return. Extreme use, such as reporting zero taxable income, could trigger an audit which, in mild cases, could lead to nullification of the transaction and, in severe cases, raise charges for tax fraud.
Our paper contributes to the economic study of the price formation process. Traditional economic theory emphasizes the role of the competitive equilibrium and relies on the fictitious Walrasian auctioneer to reach this equilibrium. Standard finance theory relies on arbitrage to reach the competitive equilibrium. The search-and-bargaining approach to the price formation process has reached the puzzling conclusion that the competitive equilibrium typically does not result, not even in the limit as frictions disappear. 5 We propose that the market for the Norwegian tax credit is a real world example of such a non-Walrasian equilibrium where unsatisfied demand coexists with positive buyer profits. Knowing how the surplus is divided between the buyers and the sellers matters when entry is endogenous. For example, in the context of labor economics, the rate of unemployment depends on the bargaining power of the workers (Moen, 1997) and, in the context of the theory of the firm, the investment level depends on how the parties divide the surplus in contract renegotiations (Grossman and Hart, 1986 ). In finance, the division of the surplus influences the cost of capital and, therefore, the real investments in the corporate sector. Specifically, our finding that the market price reflects only half the value of the tax credit suggests that firms do not capture the full benefit of the tax credit when they issue stock, which means that the cost of capital is higher than in the competitive equilibrium. This implication may carry over to other financial markets which are characterized by search. For example, Burdett and O'Hara (1987) use search theory to analyze liquidity effects associated with the sale of large blocks of shares. Duffie, Gârleanu, and Pedersen (2002) claim that the search for lenders of stock for short sales can explain some recent pricing anomalies. The markets for mortgage backed securities, bank loans, and other illiquid financial assets, are other potential search markets where the cost of capital may include a markup for imperfect competition among the buyers.
The empirical paper which is the closest to ours is McDonald (2001) , who studies the trading of a dividend tax credit in Germany and concludes that "the market value of the dividend tax credit exceeds half the credit". 6 Following the standard approach of no-arbitrage profit 5 See De Fraja and Sákovics (2001) for a recent contribution and a challenge of this view. 6 See also related evidence from Australia by Partington and Walker (2002) .
in equilibrium, McDonald (2001) explains that the interior split of the German tax credit is compensation for tax risk. We can reject this explanation based on the insight that the legal risk is borne by the buyer alone. Since the legal risk is one-sided, risky arbitrage would drive equilibrium prices down to the sellers' reservation value, but this is a constant (0% tax rate) and does not vary cross-sectionally with the size of the tax credit. 7 Contrary to this prediction, we find that the market value of the tax credit increases significantly with the size of the tax credit. Our empirical results can also be compared to those reported by Tucker (2002) in a study of a court case of the trading of the U.S. foreign tax credit (compensation for foreign withholding tax). He explains that a stock broker first searches for a tax-exempt U.S. investor, who holds the dividend-paying stock, but cannot claim the foreign tax credit, and then borrows and short sells the stock to a U.S. taxable corporation over the payment of the dividend. In a sequence of very large transactions, Tucker (2002) reports that the buyer earns 46%, the stock broker 36% (commission), and the lender of stock 18% of the foreign tax credit. Hence, the parties split in the middle with slightly more than 50% to the two sellers and slightly less than 50% to the buyer. These estimates are very close to ours.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the relevant Norwegian tax rules. Section 3 illustrates the mechanics of the tax arbitrage with one example of the trading of the tax credit and another of the dividend tax. In the next Section 4, we analyze the process of price formation around the two distributions with a view on imputing the split parameter from the stock prices. The sample and the data are described in Section 5. Section 6 reports the test methodology and the estimated split parameter along with robustness checks.
In Section 7, we document a significant difference in the trading pattern around the two events.
While the trading around the ex-dividend day is very large, the trading of stock around the distribution of the tax credit is not much different from normal. The analysis ends in Section 8 with a plan for how we can measure the short-term trading between the investor tax clienteles investors around the two distributions. The results will be reported in a future version of the paper. Section 9 concludes.
Tax Environment
This section summarizes the basic tax rules and the mechanics of the tax credit. Corporate income is first subject to a flat 28% tax at the corporate level, and then taxed again at the personal level as investors receive taxable income from holding corporate stocks and bonds.
Interest, dividends, and capital gains are lumped together in the personal tax return and taxed as investment income at a flat 28% rate. Capital gains are taxed on realization and subject to the flat 28% rate regardless of the time which elapses between the purchase and the sale of the security. 8 Capital loss can be offset against investment income, and excess loss can be offset at the 28% rate against ordinary income without limit.
These tax rules do not apply to tax-exempt and foreign investors. Tax-exempt investors include mutual funds, non-for-profit foundations, labor unions, the Church, and the Government pension fund (Trygdefonden). However, private pension funds are taxed at the 28% corporate rate. Foreign investors are subject to withholding tax on dividends from Norwegian stocks. The withholding tax is paid by the firm directly to the Norwegian treasury. The withholding tax rate is 15% for major investor countries in Europe and the U.S., and 25% for most other countries.
The foreign investor can typically offset the Norwegian withholding tax against personal income tax in his home country, but mutual funds and pension funds, which are tax-exempt in many countries, cannot claim the offsetting foreign tax credit.
Taken at face value, the Norwegian taxation of corporate income seems to favor corporate debt financing, because interest is taxed only at the personal level, while dividends and capital gains on equity are taxed at both the corporate and the personal level. However, the Norwegian tax code contains two provisions which give the corporate taxes back to shareholders. First, shareholders receive a tax credit for corporate taxes paid on distributed profits. This tax credit is received in the form of a simple accounting manipulation of the investor's tax return which makes the dividend effectively tax-exempt at the personal level. Second, shareholders also receive a tax credit for corporate taxes paid on undistributed profits. This tax credit is received in the form of an upward adjustment of the cost basis, which shields the investor from tax liability on capital gains. In the remainder of this section, we shall explain how the basis adjustment works.
Principles of the Basis Adjustment
The basis adjustment rule of the Norwegian tax code says that the investor must add to his cost basis a number which equals the accumulated corporate retained earnings over the investor's holding period. The rationale for this rule can be illustrated with the residual income model by Ohlson (1995) . We shall demonstrate that the basis adjustment rule ensures that, on average, across many stocks and long holding periods, investors do not face tax liability for capital gains on stocks. The analysis is for illustration only. Ohlson (1995) ignores personal taxes, and we do not know how his model can be extended with capital gains tax.
Time is discrete and indexed by t for each corporate income year. There is one share, investors have homogenous beliefs and are risk neutral. After the closure of the books for corporate income year t and the payment of the associated dividend D t , the stock price equals
where B t denotes the book value of equity and P V EP S t the present value of future earnings per share after corporate tax. Accordingly, after t + k years, the stock price equals
The two equations (1) and (2) are linked by the process
where RET t ≡ EP S t − D t denotes the retained earnings after corporate tax.
Consider an investor who purchases the stock at price (1) and sells the stock after k years at price (2) . Ignoring transaction costs, the investor realizes a capital gain equal to
where ∆B denotes the change in book value and ∆P V EP S the change in investors' expectations of future after-tax earnings. Take the expectation of (4), which according to (3) equals the accumulated retained earnings:
The tax credit for undistributed profits is based on this equation: The investor must add the accumulated retained earnings to his cost basis. As a result, the expected capital gain is zero:
Super index τ denotes that the expected capital gain is defined by the tax return as opposed to the expected economic capital gain given by (5) . The end result is that, in expectation, the basis adjustment removes the double taxation of undistributed profits.
Expression (6) has been derived under the assumption that the investor purchases the stock after the payment of the dividend for year t. In practice, time elapses between the closure of the books and the payment of the dividend, which makes it possible to purchase the stock after the realization of the earnings, EP S t , but before the payment of the dividend, D t . In this case, the stock price reflects the value of the current dividend and is higher than that of (1):
Therefore, if the investor purchases the stock at this price (7) and sells it at price (2), the expected capital gain is E(G) = ∆B − D t . For this case, the Norwegian tax code provides a dividend correction rule which stipulates that the investor must also subtract the first dividend from his cost basis. As a result, the expected taxable gain is zero:
A related problem arises when the investor sells the stock after the earnings have been realized, EP S t+k , but before the payment of the dividend, D t+k . In this case, the selling price reflects the value of the last dividend:
The expected difference between the selling price (9) and the purchase price (1) equals E(G) = ∆B + D t . For this case, the Norwegian tax code stipulates that the investor must add the last dividend to his cost basis. Again, the dividend correction makes sure that the expected taxable gain is zero:
Equations (6), (8), and (10) summarize the principles for taxation of capital gains in Norway.
If prices conform to (1), (2), (7), and (9), the basis adjustment rules ensure that expected tax liability is zero. The actual capital gain may deviate from the expected capital gain as a result of changes in the expectations of future profits, ∆P V EP S . Such gains are subject to double taxation, first at the personal level when the investor sells the stock, and then at the corporate level when the firm realizes the earnings which generated the capital gain in the first place. In this way, the Norwegian tax code accomplishes the dual objective of taxing expected corporate income only at the corporate level and, at the same time, taxing speculative gains both at the corporate and the personal level.
In practice, the earnings are defined by the corporate tax return and cannot be negative EP S t ≥ 0. Corporate loss can be carried forward and reduces future corporate tax liability, but cannot be carried back. Therefore, investors do not face the risk of accumulating tax liability by holding stock during periods of corporate losses. Note that the step-up amount can be negative, RET t < 0, when the firm pays dividends which exceed current earnings. In this case, investors accumulate tax liability, but are nevertheless compensated through the dividends which generated the negative step-up amounts.
Taxation of Short-Term Trading Around the Two Distributions
We conclude the description of the tax environment by stating the formulas for the capital gains calculation which apply to the short-term trader who purchases the stock right before the distribution of the tax credit and the dividend, respectively, and sells it back right after. We also discuss the possible legal complications which apply to short-term trading strategies.
Corporate income is uncertain, so the distributions of both the tax credit and the dividend take place after the earnings have been realized. The time line of events can be seen in Figure 1 .
The right to the tax credit is distributed to the shareholders at the turn of the year. At this time, the retained earnings are unknown and must be estimated, E(RET t ). A few months later, the shareholder meeting approves of the dividend, D t , which is also paid at the meeting. The tax authorities examine the corporate tax return and finalize the step-up amount in February year t + 2. An investor, who owns the stock at the turn of the year and sells the stock within a year, can claim the tax credit in his personal tax return for year t + 1, which is due in April year t + 2. The tax credit benefits the investor through reduced tax liability. Since the step-up amount is not finalized until February year t + 2, the investor must wait more than fourteen months after the distribution before he can benefit from the tax credit through reduced income tax liability. Consider an investor who purchases the stock on the last day of the year and sells the stock on the first day of the new year. Let P c denote the buy price including the right to the tax credit and P e the sell price without this right. Since the investor sells the stock, he must report a capital gain in his personal tax return for year t + 1. The rule expressed in (10) applies:
This means that the short-term trader receives a tax credit equal to 28% of the corporate earnings per share, RET t + D t = EP S t . Next, consider the corresponding short-term trading strategy around the payment of the dividend. The sale of the stock on the ex-dividend day releases a tax liability, which according to the rule expressed in (8) , equals 28% times the taxable capital gain:
Hence, the dividend capturer must subtract the dividend from his basis. The determination of the prices P c and P e in (11) and (12) is the focus of the analysis in Section 4.
The short-term trading strategies leading to expressions (11) and (12) may be subject to a general provision in the Norwegian tax code against transactions which serve no other purpose than avoiding taxes. Specifically, the tax authorities may nullify the sell transaction and claim that a realization has not occurred for tax purposes. In this case, the investor would lose the right to claim the tax credit. The tax authorities may also nullify the buy transaction.
This happened in May 1998. Following the newspaper coverage of conspicuously large trading volumes around the ex-dividend day, the Norwegian tax authorities audited the major domestic banks and brokerage firms and nullified some particularly large transactions between the banks and foreign institutional investors. Since the Norwegian tax authorities have no jurisdiction over foreign investors, they deemed the domestic banks and brokerage houses to pay the avoided withholding taxes. This case illustrates that investors must consider the legal risks when they trade for tax purposes. The decision to nullify a transaction is made by the officer at the local tax office where the investor files his tax return. The decision is subjective and based on the volume of trade, the time that elapses between the buy and the sell transactions, and whether the position is hedged. The case also illustrates that, in transactions between domestic taxable investors, on one side, and tax-exempt and foreign investors, on the other side, the legal risk is one-sided and borne by the domestic taxable investor alone, because the Norwegian tax authorities have no jurisdiction over tax-exempt and foreign investors. 9 
Dividing the Tax Credit: An Example
We study the distribution of the tax credit to the shareholders of one of the savings bank (Spare- To see the mechanics of the tax arbitrage, ignore transaction costs, uncertainty, and discounting. Suppose that the seller is a tax-exempt domestic investor and the buyer a taxable
Norwegian investor who can use the step-up amount to shield taxes at the 28% rate. The parties meet and trade on the last day of the year, and then again on the first day of the new year. The seller makes a capital gain in the amount 211 − 188 = 23 kroner and the buyer a corresponding loss. However, the buyer covers his loss with the tax credit. At the time of the trade, the step-up amount is unknown and must be estimated. In this case, the step-up amount was later finalized to 111 kroner per certificate, which is extremely large relative to the market price of 211 kroner on the last business day before the distribution. 11 Therefore, the buyer cover his 10 The group of domestic taxable investors includes domestic corporations which may face an effective zero marginal tax rate due to losses and depreciations. We cannot distinguish in the data between firms which are in a taxable position from those which are not.
11 Savings banks often have large tax credits as a result of two mistakes in the tax code. First, a tax credit is 
Price Formation Around the Distributions
We analyze the price formation around the two distributions. Two fundamentally different market mechanisms are proposed. First, the tax credit is traded in a decentralized market where potential buyers must search for potential sellers, and vice versa. The role of financial intermediaries is, if any, to enhance the matching process and not to purchase any tax credits for their own benefit. We show that buyers and sellers divide the surplus somewhere in the middle. Second, the dividend tax obligation is traded in a centralized market where market makers wait for potential sellers to arrive and willingly take the other side of the trade as long as they earn the competitive rate for their intermediation services. As a result of Bertrand competition among market makers, the sellers capture the surplus.
Tax Credit
The market for tax credits opens towards the end of December and ends on the last business day of the year. Buyers are matched with sellers and, once matched, they bargain over the surplus.
First, we analyze the bilateral bargaining between one potential buyer and one potential seller.
Then, we derive the equilibrium when the agents have the outside option to return to the market for a new match.
Bargaining
A potential buyer meets with a potential seller and bargains over the gains from trade. The prospective buyer is a taxable investor who can use the the step-up amount EP S > 0 to shield taxes at rate τ [see (11) ]. The seller is a tax-exempt investor who cannot benefit from this right.
The tax credit is physically attached to the ownership of the stock, so the buyer must purchase provided to the savings banks certificates for corporate taxes on undistributed profits despite that the certificates have no claim on those cash flows. Second, the tax credits are inflated, because the non-traded equity is missing from the calculations. In the example displayed in Figure 2 , the savings banks certificates constitute only 15% of equity. This means that the step-up amount per share is inflated by a factor 1/0.15 ≈ 6.67. In September 2000, the Norwegian tax authorities corrected the two mistakes and stopped the distribution of tax credits to savings banks.
the stock from the seller and hold it over the distribution of the tax credit. An agreement means that the buyer purchases the stock at the cum-right price P c per share and promises to sell it back at the ex-right price P e . The negotiated price difference, P c − P e , is a capital gain to the seller and a capital loss to the buyer and constitutes how much the buyer pays for the tax credit.
We make the following specific assumptions: i) The cash flows from the tax credit are earned at the time of trade, ii) no time elapses between the trade cum-right and the trade ex-right, iii) the parties can estimate the step-up amount E(EP S) without error, iv) legal risks can be safely ignored, and v) each party incurs an after-tax, transaction-specific cost c with both the buy and the sell transaction. The first assumption means that the buyer earns the tax credit at the same time as he realizes the capital loss, which implies that the purchase is self-financed and risk free for the buyer. The second assumption means that the ownership of the underlying stock never changes hands. These two assumptions also reduce notation as discounting can be ignored. The third and the fourth assumptions simplify the analysis by ignoring estimation risk and legal risk, respectively. To keep the positions of the buyer and the seller as symmetric as possible, we define the transaction cost after tax and ignore that explicit transaction costs may be tax deductible.
The taxable investor is willing to buy the tax credit if the tax savings exceed the capital loss and the transaction costs:
The first term is the buyer's capital loss after tax, the second term the transaction cost, and the third term the tax credit. The tax-exempt investor is willing to supply the tax credit if the capital gain exceeds his transaction costs:
The surplus is obtained by adding the two reservation prices:
Note that the surplus is endogenous and depends on how it is divided. This is because the negotiated capital loss shields income tax in addition to the right to step up the basis. The two reservation prices (13) and (14) are displayed in Figure 3 . A transaction takes place when the buyer's valuation exceeds that of the seller, which occurs to the right of the intersection of the two lines. Otherwise, to the left of the intersection, the parties do not trade. The most the buyer can pay for the tax credit (capital loss P c − P e ), and the least the seller requires to sell the tax credit (capital gain P c − P e ). The equilibrium falls between the lines to the right of the intersection. E(EP S) denotes the expected step-up amount and 2c the round-trip transaction cost.
Define γ ∈ [0, 1] as the seller's share of the surplus. The seller demands his reservation price (14) plus a share γ of the surplus (15) . After re-arranging:
The negotiated capital gain to the seller is a linear function of the expected step-up amount.
The intercept term depends on the unobservable transaction costs, but equals zero for γ = 1/2.
The slope coefficient depends only on the split parameter and the observable marginal tax rate (τ = 28%), so the split parameter γ can be imputed from an estimate of the slope coefficient.
Equilibrium
The problem of dividing the surplus in a search market was first analyzed by Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) , who studied the price formation process in a model where the number of buyers and sellers remains constant over time. Binmore and Herrero (1988) extend their analysis to the case when all agents enter simultaneously and subsequently leave the market as they trade, which means that the number of buyers and sellers decreases over time. The latter case describes the market for the tax credit. We choose to illustrate the insights from Binmore and Herrero We shall focus on the special case with more potential buyers than sellers (B ≥ S). This is the only asymmetry in the model. Arguably, in our application, the number of buyers can be as many as the number of Norwegian tax payers (up to 2 million), while the number of sellers can be at most the number of tax-exempt Norwegian and foreign investors who hold the particular stock which carries the tax credit (at most a few thousand). Each seller is matched with only one buyer at the same time. Therefore, the probability that a buyer meets a seller is B/S and the probability that a seller meets a buyer is 1. There are no search frictions that could reduce those probabilities. When there are more buyers than sellers, Osborne and Rubinstein (1990,pp.128-130) show that the split parameter is:
There are three interesting results. First, for any positive discount factor δ > 0, sellers get a larger share of the surplus γ ∈ [1/2, 1]. The unequal split reflects the stiffer competition among the buyers, but the solution is symmetric and the parties split equally when B = S. Second, as agents get more patient and the discount rate approaches one, more of the surplus goes to the sellers, because they can afford to wait another period. On the other hand, with a high degree of impatience, the option to return to the market for a new match gets unattractive and, in the limit as δ → 0, the parties get locked into a bilateral monopoly and they split equally. Hence, the advantage of being on the short side of the market is mitigated by the traders' impatience.
Third, for any δ < 1, buyers earn positive profit despite excess demand (B ≥ S). The reason is that both buyers and sellers are impatient and want to settle the trade even if this means that the short side must give up some surplus to the buyers.
The parameters {B, S, δ} are unobservable, but we can test the restriction that γ ∈ [1/2, 1].
Furthermore, knowing that the trading opportunity vanishes on the last business day of the year, sellers may become extremely unwilling to exercise their outside option and return to the market. Under this additional assumption, we can test whether γ = 1/2. In the model above, this occurs when agents become extremely impatient (δ → 0). In the fully developed theory by Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) and Binmore and Herrero (1988) , this also occurs when the probability of getting a new match approaches zero. Either assumption serves to isolate the agents from the market, which means that the only asymmetry, B ≥ S, is effectively removed.
From the resulting symmetry, bargaining power must also be equal. 12 
Arbitrage
The equilibrium price (16) implies that, for any γ < 1, buyers make positive profits at the same time as there is unsatisfied demand. This result is a consequence of the assumption that each buyer is willing to purchase at most one unit, which gives the buyer a strategic advantage once he has been matched with a seller. In this section, we examine the implications from relaxing the unit demand assumption and opening up the model for arbitrage. Ultimately, we want to test whether observed market prices are best described as the outcome of search and bargaining or the outcome of arbitrage.
Specifically, we keep the assumptions that the buyer is not concerned with estimation risk 12 There are other ways to generate the equal division of the surplus. Suppose that the decision to leave a partner and search for a new match is a strategic decision. Then, one possible equilibrium is to never leave a partner, which would result in total isolation of the market and imply γ = 1/2. See, e.g., Binmore (1985) .
or legal risk, and that the purchase of the tax credit is self-financed, but we allow any buyer to return to the market as many times as he wishes. Then, risk-free arbitrage activity ensures that the buyer's reservation price (13) must equal zero in equilibrium:
This equilibrium implies that sellers have all the bargaining power, γ = 1. We can test the implications that the price change over the distribution is a linear function of the step-up amount with negative intercept and a slope coefficient equal to τ /(1 − τ ).
Next, suppose that the buyer is concerned with estimation risk and legal risk and demands a risk premium which increases with each additional unit of the tax credit he purchases. In this case, risky arbitrage activity ensures that the seller's reservation price must equal zero in equilibrium:
This equilibrium implies that buyers have all the bargaining power, γ = 0. We can test the implication that the price change over the distribution does not vary with the step-up amount.
Liquidity Traders
We have assumed that only buyers and sellers of the tax credit are active in the stock market towards the end of the year. However, additional supply and demand may be generated by investors who have decided to trade for liquidity reasons regardless of the distribution of the tax credit. In this section, we show that, if prices conform to (16) , liquidity traders will postpone their trades to after the distribution of the tax credit and, therefore, not contaminate our inference on the split parameter.
First, consider a long-term holder of the stock. The investor's basis is P b (including all tax credits leading up to the current distribution) and he is taxed on capital gains at rate τ . Since he has decided to sell, the transaction costs are sunk and can be ignored. He chooses between selling before and after the distribution of the tax credit and is indifferent with respect to the timing of the trade when
which can be written as
For γ < 1, we can see that the right hand side of (20) exceeds that of (16) , which means that the long-term seller values the tax-credit higher than the short-term buyer. Hence, for γ < 1, the long-term seller postpones the trade, captures the tax credit, and supplies his shares in the beginning of the new year.
Next, consider a long-term buyer of the stock, who also faces the choice between buying before or after the distribution. Suppose that he purchases the stock before the distribution and captures the tax credit. Then, absent transaction costs, his optimal realization strategy would be to sell immediately to claim the tax credit, but this means that he is acting as a short-term buyer. Hence, the long-term buyer will also postpone the transaction to after the distribution of the tax credit.
Dividend Tax
Our analysis of the price formation process around the ex-dividend day follows closely that of Boyd and Jagannathan (1994) and assumes that equilibrium prices are determined by arbitrage.
In the dividend case, the potential seller does not need to search for a potential buyer, but can always trade with one of the market makers. The prospective seller is a foreign investor who wants to avoid the withholding tax on the dividend at rate τ w . Apart from the withholding tax, the foreign investor is tax-exempt. The prospective buyer is a domestic investor, who is tax-exempt on the dividend but must pay capital gains tax at rate τ . As with the tax credit, the withholding tax obligation is physically attached to the ownership of the stock, so the buyer must purchase the stock before the payment of the dividend and sell it back afterwards.
Continuing the analogy with the tax credit, an agreement means that the buyer purchases the stock at the cum-right price P c and promises to sell it back at the ex-right price P e . Hence, the negotiated price difference is a capital gain to the seller and a capital loss to the buyer, who covers his loss with the cash dividend.
We maintain the specific, analogous assumptions from the analysis of the tax credit: i) The dividend is paid at the time of trade, ii) no time elapses between the trade cum-right and the trade ex-right, iii) legal risks can be safely ignored, and iv) each party incurs an after-tax, transaction-specific cost c with both the buy and the sell transaction. These assumptions ensure that the dividend capture is self-financed and risk free, so the buyer is willing to purchase unlimited quantities of stock (as opposed to one unit). Specifically, the profit per share from dividend capture equals
The term within brackets is a capital loss. In computing the capital loss, we have invoked the specific provision of the Norwegian tax code which says that the dividend capturer must subtract the dividend from his basis [see (12) ]. Competition among market makers ensures that there is zero profit in equilibrium. Setting the profit condition equal to zero and re-arranging gives:
The price drop over the ex-dividend day is a linear function of the dividend, where the intercept term depends on the unobservable transaction cost, but is strictly negative, and the slope coefficient equals unity. Neither the withholding tax rate τ w nor the capital gains tax rate τ influences the slope coefficient. The former is irrelevant as a result of competition among market makers, and the latter disappears as a result of the provision that requires that the dividend is subtracted from the buyer's cost basis. As a result, the dividend capturer is tax neutral between dividends and capital gains.
The foreign investor supplies his stock if the price change in (21) exceeds his reservation price:
The no-arbitrage condition and the seller's reservation price are exhibited in The most the domestic investor is willing to pay for the dividend (capital loss P c − P e ), and the least the foreign investor requires to sell the dividend (capital gain P c − P e ). The area between the lines to the right of the intersection is the gain to trade. D denotes the dividend, τ the capital gains tax rate, and 2c the round-trip transaction cost.
Data & Summary Statistics
Stock price and trading volume data are taken from a tape which covers all transactions on the Oslo Stock Exchange. The tape contains the last transaction price of the day, the best uncleared buy limit order, the best uncleared sell limit order, and the aggregate trading volume of each differ in their voting rights and foreign ownership eligibility. 14 We aggregate the trading volume 14 There are A shares carrying voting rights and B shares without voting rights. Before 1995, there are also F shares which are eligible for both domestic and foreign investors. The different classes create a natural experiment in that there cannot be any tax-related trading between foreign and domestic investors in the class which has no foreign investors. The cross-section is small and the time-series short, however.
across the classes, but choose to study the prices for the class of stock with the longest listing period. When the listing periods are equal, we choose the most liquid class. Table 1 reports summary statistics relating to the trading frequency. We measure liquidity by the proportion of business days with trading volume, the spread between the best buy and sell limit order at the end of the day, and the daily turnover of stock defined as the number of shares traded divided by the number of shares outstanding. We can see in the top row that stocks are traded, on average, 63.3% of the business days. The trading frequency goes all the way down to 0.4% for one firm which was listed but almost never traded. 15 The middle row shows summary statistics related to the spread defined as the difference between the best buy and the best sell limit order relative to the midpoint. For each stock we pick the median spread. The cross-section average of the median spreads is 4.7%, but the most liquid Norwegian stocks has a median spread of 0.2%. Finally, in the bottom row, we can see that average daily turnover is 0.3%, which translates into about 75% annually. This is quite high and suggests that the distribution of trading volume is extremely skewed, since many days have zero volume.
However, the thrust of those statistics is that many firms are barely traded despite their listing status. Norwegian stocks and 18 savings banks certificates listed some time between January 1992 and September 1999. The proportion of business days when the stock is traded, the median bid-ask spread relative to the midpoint, and the number of shares traded divided by the number of shares outstanding.
Mean Median
The sample period 1992-99 covers 1,068 firm/year observations. The step-up amount is negative or zero in 522 cases, so the number of distributions of positive tax credits equals 546.
The step-up amount is zero when firms shield income from corporate taxation using tax-loss deductions, depreciations (offshore sector), or the firm is tax-exempt (shipping). Since many Norwegian stocks are barely traded, we include only those observations when the stock is traded both before and after the distribution within a time span of fifteen calendar days. Prices which are separated by a wider time span provide little or no information about the instantaneous price change over the distribution. The non-trading screen reduces the number of distributions of the tax credit from 546 to 465. After the screen, the number of calendar days, which elapses from the last trade including the right to the tax credit to the first trade after, ranges from 3 to 15. The mode is 3 days and the median 4 days.
Norwegian firms pay annual dividends. Special dividends are rare. During 1992-99, the Norwegian firms made a total of 676 dividend payments. After imposing the thin-trading screen, the number of ex-dividend days decreases from 676 to 588. The range for the time span between the last trade cum-dividend to the first trade ex-dividend day is 1 to 15 days, the mode is 1, and the median also 1. As is typical for studies of the ex-dividend day, the observations are clustered in calendar time. The 588 ex-dividend days take place on 305 calendar days.
Summary statistics for the main variables are presented in Table 2 . We start with the tax credit in Panel a). The first row shows that the average step-up amount is 6.5% of the cum-right price, and the value-weighted average 4.2%. The extreme positive step-up amount of 50.3% goes with one of the savings banks. The average step-up amount for common stocks is 4.8% and for savings banks certificates 19.1%. In the second row, we see the price drop over the distribution as a fraction of the cum-right price. The average is negative, -1.4% equally-weighted and -1.6%
value-weighted, which means that stock prices increase over the turn of the year despite the distribution of the tax credit. This is indicative of a turn-of-the-year effect in the data, which we shall return to in Section 6.3, but inconsistent with the prediction of (16).
Arithmetic Weighted Standard Minimum Maximum mean mean deviation a) Tax Credit
Step-up over price Table 2 : Summary Statistics: Panel a). The step-up amount divided by the last transaction price cum-right, and the change from the last trade cum-right to the first trade ex-right over the cum-right price. There are 465 observations. Panel b). The dividend divided by the last transaction price cum-dividend, the change from the last price cum-dividend to the first price ex-dividend over the cum-dividend price, and the change from the cum-dividend price to the ex-dividend price over the dividend. There are 588 observations. Table 2 contains the corresponding statistics for the ex-dividend day. The top row shows that the equally-weighted average dividend yield is 3.9% and the value-weighted average 2.6%. A few firms in our sample pay extremely large, special dividends up to 76.5%
Panel b) of
of the cum-dividend price. The middle row shows that the price drop is smaller than the dividend yield. As a result, the price drop over the dividend is less than unity, as can be seen in the bottom row. The equally-weighted average price drop equals 63.5% of the dividend, and the value-weighted price drop 77%. These estimates are comparable to the average of 70.7%
reported by Boyd and Jagannathan (1994) for U.S. equity.
We can also compare the ex-dividend day price drops in Table 2 with those reported in a detailed study of six very large transactions in May 1998 [Stokke and Elvsborg (1999) ]. The seller is a foreign investment bank, which (probably) acts on the behalf of investors who hold
Norwegian stocks in deposit with the bank. The buyer is a Norwegian bank or brokerage house (two cases) or a Norwegian corporation (four cases). In the latter cases, the securities are passed through a Norwegian bank or brokerage house. The average purchase amount in each of the six transactions is more than 300 million kroner ($40 million), the average dividend about 8 million kroner ($1 million), and the avoided withholding tax 1.2 million kroner. In five of the six cases, the buyer hedges the position through various repurchase agreements, which are described in the label of Table 3 . We can see in the bottom row that the seller earns, on average, 78% of the surplus (before transaction costs) and, consequently, the buyer 22%. The latter is the share of the surplus earned by the Norwegian bank and the corporation together.
Estimating the Split Parameter
The analysis is carried out in three steps. First, we present the empirical methodology, then the estimation results, and finally some robustness checks related to the turn-of-the-year effect.
Methodology
Following Boyd and Jagannathan (1994) and McDonald (2001), we estimate equation (16) with regression analysis: b) Forward contract. The foreign investor promises to buy back the stock ex-dividend at a pre-specified price.
c) Implicit forward. The foreign investor purchases a European call and sells a European put with the same exercise price replicating a forward contract.
d) European call. The foreign investor purchases the right to buy back the stock shortly after the ex-dividend day. The strike price is relatively low to ensure that the option will be exercised.
e) American call. The foreign investor purchases the right to buy back the stock at any time after the ex-dividend day up to the maturity several months later. The time to maturity is long to ensure that the option is likely to be exercised.
where r m is the return on the market index from the last trade cum-right to the first trade ex-right. Adding r m to the left hand side controls for discounting over the three to four days that elapse between the last trade cum-right and the first trade ex-right, and it also removes the cross-correlations among the error terms which are due to market movements. A fundamental problem is to measure the expected step-up amount. We shall assume that investors have perfect foresight and can predict the step-up amount without error, E(EP S) = EP S. After we have presented our results, we discuss the importance of this assumption.
The regression parameters are related to the structural parameters as
The split parameter can be imputed from the slope coefficient:
.
There are three particularly interesting reference points:
The search model predicts that γ ∈ [1/2, 1]. This contrasts with the risk-free arbitrage model which implies that γ = 1 and the risky arbitrage model with the prediction that γ = 0.
A corresponding regression model for the ex-dividend day (21) is:
The predicted intercept is strictly negative, a < 0, and the slope coefficient one, b = 1.
The two regressions (22) and (23) can be estimated with ordinary least squares. We also employ weighted least squares. The volatility of the error term varies cross-sectionally, because stocks have different risks and the instantaneous price change over the distribution is estimated over time periods which vary from 1 to 15 calendar days. Suppose that stock returns follow an arithmetic process with i.i.d. disturbances. The stock return between calendar dates t − k and t is then
For each stock, over its entire stock price history in 1992-99, we estimate the average daily
and variance
The regression weight is then
Estimation Results
In this section, we report the results from the two regressions (22) and (23) .
Panel a) of Table 4 Table 4 : Regression Results: Panel a). The price drop over the pre-distribution price plus the return on the market is regressed on realization of the step-up amount over the cum-right price using ordinary least squares with White's correction for heteroscedasticity, and weighted least squares using (26) , respectively. The t-statistics reported below the coefficients test whether the coefficients are equal to zero. Index a denotes significance level 5% or better. Standard errors computed with the delta method are reported below the split parameter. The F-statistic tests the joint parameter restrictions implied by γ = 1/2. P-values are reported below the F-statistics. There are 465 observations. Panel b). The drop over the pre-distribution price plus the market return is regressed on the dividend yield. The t-statistics reported below the coefficients test the hypotheses that the intercept is zero and the slope coefficient is one. There are 588 observations. regression parameters, we think that the potential bias is minor, so we omit sensitivity analysis and only discuss which data sources investors can use to form earnings per share forecasts. Stock Exchange, and electronic copies are available for some large firms since 1996.
Turn-of-the-Year Effect
An extensive empirical literature has documented abnormal return patterns around the turn of the year. In particular, small stocks with poor stock price performance over the preceding year have been found to exhibit positive abnormal returns during the first days of January [e.g., Reinganum (1983) , Sias and Starks (1995) ]. Here, we document a similar turn-of-the-year effect in our data and show that our inference relating to the split parameter is not altered when we control for the stock's performance over the previous year.
The presence of a turn-of-the-year effect in our data can be seen in Figure 5 . The upper plot displays the average abnormal returns for the 25% of the stocks with the worst stock price performance during the previous calendar year, and the lower plot shows the corresponding averages for the 25% of the stocks with the best stock price performance. Stock price performance has been measured as the ratio of the highest price during the year to the price at the end of the year. 16 The returns are market-adjusted and the averages have been weighted according to (26) . We can see in the upper plot that loser stocks earn persistent negative abnormal returns credits, the average return for loser stocks increases from 1.87% to 2.78%, and for winner stocks 16 All results in this section are qualitatively similar if we use instead the average daily stock return during the previous year or the ratio of the volume-weighted transaction price during the past year to the year-end price.
from -1.32% to 0.53%. i.e., an increase by almost 1%. Figure 5 : Turn of the Year Returns and Past Performance. Weighted average, marketadjusted returns for the 25% worst performers in the previous year (loser stocks) and the 25% best performers (winner stocks). The weight is given by (26) .
To check the influence of the turn-of-the-year effect on the results in Section 6.2, we reestimate (22) controlling for the stock's past performance:
where P h denotes the highest price during the previous year. The expected slope coefficient of the past performance variable is negative. The regression results are reported in Table 5 using weighted least squares. In the first regression, we use only the observations with positive tax credit (E(EP S) > 0), while in the second regression, we add all the observations where the tax credit is zero (E(EP S) = 0). We can see that the past performance variable adds explanatory power without influencing the slope coefficient of the tax credit variable. Accordingly, the imputed split parameter is unaltered. We can also see that the explanatory power of the past performance variable is much higher in the second regression which uses all observations. This difference between the regressions suggests that the distribution of the tax credit mitigates the turn-of-the-year effect, i.e., the underlying factors that generate the turn-of-the-year effect do not seem to be at force when the tax credit is positive. The price drop over the pre-distribution price plus the return on the market is regressed on the realization of the step-up amount over the cum-right price and past performance over the previous calendar year measured as the ratio of the highest price (P h ) to the year-end price (P c ). The coefficients are estimated with weighted least squares. t-statistics are reported below the coefficients. Index a denotes significance level 5% or better. Standard errors computed with the delta method are reported below the estimates of the split parameter. N is the number of observations.
Abnormal Trading Volume
The theory in Section 4 does not offer any implications as to how many stocks are traded for tax purposes. Hence, the results in this section are only suggestive. We document that large amounts of stock are traded around the ex-dividend day, in particular before the audit in May 1998, while trading activity looks normal around the distribution of the tax credit except in a few firms with large tax credits such as the savings bank in Figure 2 . Loosely speaking, the high trading volume around the ex-dividend day is consistent with arbitrage activity, while the small trading volume relating to the tax credit seems compatible with an illiquid search market. Figure 6 , we measure abnormal turnover as the average daily turnover from day -5 to +1 (event period) minus the average daily turnover from day -30 to -16 (bench mark period).
where AT O denotes abnormal turnover and F OR is the foreign ownership fraction. The dividend yield replaces the expected step-up amount in the dividend regression. The regressions are value-weighted. A few observations are missing as we cannot measure the abnormal trading volume for stocks where the time series begin late in the year.
In Table 6 , Panel a), we can see that the abnormal turnover around the distribution of the tax credit increases significantly with the step-up amount (yield), but is unrelated to the foreign around the ex-dividend day increases with both the dividend yield and the foreign ownership fraction. We can also see that the correlations disappear in the post-audit sample. Together, these empirical findings suggest that the abnormal trading volume is generated by short-term tax trading, that foreign investors supply the dividends, and that tax-exempt Norwegian investors supply the tax credits. Table 6 : Volume Regressions: Abnormal turnover is measured as the daily average turnover from day -5 to +1 minus the daily average turnover from day -30 to -16. The independent variables are the step-up amount over cum-right price, the dividend over cum-dividend price, and the foreign ownership fraction. The regressions are value-weighted. The numbers below the coefficients are t-statistics, where superscript a denotes significance level 5% or better.
Constant

Who Is Trading?
Listed Norwegian stocks are kept as book entries in the official, electronic ownership record, 17 and transactions are registered as changes in and out of accounts. We are in the process of purchasing and analyzing ownership data for 1997, 1998, and 1999 to address the following questions:
1. Does the Norwegian ownership fraction increase temporarily around the ex-dividend day?
If so, is the increase in the domestic ownership fraction primarily driven by an increase in 
Conclusion
We have estimated how buyers and sellers divide the surplus in tax arbitrage. The analysis has focused on the observed difference between the market for the tax credit, where buyers and sellers divide the surplus in the middle, and the market for the dividend tax, where sellers capture the surplus. We have argued that this difference reflects the activity of the professional traders who willingly act as market makers in the market for the dividend tax, but are reluctant to purchase the tax credits even if the expected profit is positive. Consistent with these interpretations, we have documented large abnormal trading volume in the market for the dividend tax, but only small abnormal trading volume in the tax credit market. In a future version of the paper, we plan to provide additional support from the electronic ownership record, which allows us to describe the matching of buyers with sellers.
We have hypothesized that arbitrage is prevented by the uncertainty of the cash flows from the tax credit. We leave for future empirical research to identify other cases which can be characterized by search rather than arbitrage. Notably, we suggest an avenue to reinterpret some of the evidence related to the ex-dividend day, in particular those that involve the trading of a tax credit. For example, Green and Rydqvist (1999) are not important for modelling ex-dividend day returns in the UK. However, a tax credit is attached to the dividend, and if investors divide the surplus in the middle, an insignificant intercept could result according to (16) .
Finally, we have documented the use of derivatives to separate the dividend tax obligation from the ownership of the stock. As a result, the market maker can engage in risk-free tax arbitrage as envisioned by Kalay (1982) and Boyd and Jagannathan (1994) . The arbitrage approach to analyzing ex-dividend day returns contrasts with the equilibrium approach advanced in a sequence of papers by Michaely and Murgia (1995) , Michaely and Vila (1996) , and Michaely, Vila, and Wang (1997). The theme of these papers is that professional traders are concerned with risk sharing and cannot take unlimited positions in the dividend-paying stock. To the extent that derivatives are used in general, the evidence in our paper tilts the evidence in support for the arbitrage approach.
10 Appendix: Changes in the Norwegian Tax Code
Section 2 describes the current version of the tax code. In this Appendix, we describe the two previous versions of the tax code. The changes in the tax code have been incorporated in the empirical analysis in the paper.
The first version of the tax code as of January 1, 1992, stipulated that investors could step up their basis with the retained earnings according to (6) , but it did not recognize the dividend corrections in (8) and (10) . The step-up amount was defined as the current earnings minus the actual dividend of the previous year:
The second tax code as of December 20, 1993 , introduced a slightly modified version of the dividend correction. As in (8) , the investor who purchases the stock after the turn of the year, but before the payment of the dividend, must subtract the dividend from his cost basis, but only if doing so does not lead to or increase a capital gain. This is a loss-limit clause. Furthermore, as in (10), the investor who holds the stock over the turn of the year, but sells it before the payment of the dividend, must add the dividend to his cost basis, but only if doing so does not lead to or increase a capital loss. This is a corresponding gain-limit clause. The third tax code as of June 7, 1996 , simply removed the loss-limit and the gain-limit clauses.
The second tax code also changed the definition of the step-up amount. For the corporate income year 1993, the step-up amount was defined as the current earnings minus both the actual dividend of the previous year and the planned current dividend:
where super index a denotes actual and p planned. For the next corporate income year, 1994, and from then on, the step-up amount has been defined as the current earnings minus the planned current dividend:
This is the definition that we have used in Section 2. Most of the time, the planned dividend is approved by the shareholder meeting. In the few cases when the shareholder meeting alters the planned dividend, the step-up amount for the next year is reduced by the difference between the planned and the actual dividend:
This definition applies to special dividends which are paid later in the year and, therefore, influence the step-up amount for the next year.
The changes of the tax code mean that the value of capturing the tax credit has increased over time:
max(RET t , 0) , 1994, 1995, 1996 1997, 1998, 1999. In the first tax code, the step-up amount equals the retained earnings and may be positive or negative, in the second code, the step-up amount is also equal to the retained earnings, but the dividend correction ensures that the step-up amount is always non-negative, and in the third tax code, the step-up amount is always equal to the sum of retained earnings and dividends, or the earnings per share, which is non-negative according to the corporate tax return.
Dividend Capture in 1992-1996
The first version of the tax code applies to dividend capture in 1992 and 1993. The tax code did not recognize the dividend correction, which changes the no-arbitrage condition to:
−P c + P e + D − τ (P e − P c ) − 2c = 0,
As can be seen, the price drop depends on the marginal tax rate. A taxable domestic investor prefers the dividend and is willing to purchase the dividend at a premium of 38.89% on the margin. This is an additional tax asymmetry that raises the gains from trade. The regression results in Table 4 are not materially affected by including the data from 1992-93, so we do not control for this difference when we estimate (23) .
The second version of the tax code applies to dividend capture in 1994, 1995, and 1996.
The dividend correction was introduced, but subject to the gain-limit clause, which complicates the derivation of the no-arbitrage condition without changing the result. The cash flows from dividend capture are:
−P c + P e + D − τ {P e − [P c − min(D, max(P c − P e , 0))]} − 2c = 0.
The dividend capturer can subtract the smallest of the full amount of the dividend or the price drop over the ex-dividend day without generating a capital gain. Assume that the price drop equals (21) , which implies that P c − P e < D. Hence, we subtract P c − P e from the cost basis, which leads to the assumed solution (21) . The solution is unique, since we have one equation
(the no-arbitrage condition) and one unknown (the price drop).
